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In this paper, we investigate the problem of controlling shareholder Non-Operational Fund Occu-
pancy (NOFO) in China, where controlling shareholders directly take funds away from listed ﬁrms
without matching business transactions. The NOFO problem was an evident and widely used
tunneling activity in China andwas identiﬁed by the securities market regulators. Unlike previous
literature that used indirectmeasures of tunneling, we directly collect the actual amounts of NOFO
from mandated disclosures and utilize this direct measure of tunneling in a series of empirical
tests. First, we examine and ﬁnd that various mechanisms such as ownership structure, corporate
governance and institutional environments could restrain tunneling activities. Second, we ﬁnd
signiﬁcantly positive market reactions to regulations that aimed to solve the NOFO problem.
Third, we ﬁnd evidence that the operating performance and valuation of ﬁrms with a NOFO
problem improved after the regulations went into effect. Our study sheds light on the severe
issue of minority shareholder expropriation and the effectiveness of regulators' policy to remedy
the tunneling problem.







Inﬁrmswith concentrated ownership, the controlling shareholders can use their controlling power to expropriateminority share-
holders. This agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is referred to as “tunneling” in the litera-
ture (Johnson et al., 2000) and has attracted intensive research interest in the ﬁelds of ﬁnance and economics. However, because
tunneling can take various, often hidden forms, extant studies have relied on indirectmeasures of tunneling throughmeasuring either
the price paid for corporate control or the changes in ﬁrms'market value around speciﬁc events.1 That is, the existence andmagnitude
of tunneling are inferred from investors' reactions to ﬁrm activities rather than measured directly (e.g., funds taken away from listed
ﬁrms). For example, Bae et al. (2002) infer tunneling from market price reactions to mergers within Korean business groups, and
Cheung et al. (2006) infer tunneling frommarket price changes around announcements of related party transactionswith controlling
shareholders. These types of studies routinely suffer from the problem of how to separate the legitimate portion of these transactions
from the illegitimate portion (i.e. tunneling).
The Chinese stock market offers an unusual opportunity to clearly identify and directly measure tunneling by controlling
shareholders. Prior to 2006, the controlling shareholders of many listed ﬁrms directly took funds from listed ﬁrms in the form of
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inter-corporate loans. These loans amount to billions of RMB, and most loan holders do not pay any interest or pay very low interest.
Take Fenghua Co. (stock code 600615) as an example. On December 31, 2002, the controlling shareholder and its afﬁliated companies
borrowed 198.6 million RMB from the listed ﬁrm, a sum that was even larger than the ﬁrm's total equity (116.21 million RMB). The
controlling shareholder laterwent into bankruptcy and a large amount of the loanswerewritten off.2 This type of inter-corporate loan
is ﬂagrant tunneling because these loan transactions were not matched with any normal business transactions (e.g., asset sales or
product sales/purchases). In 2006, the Chinese securities market regulator (Chinese Security Regulatory Commission, or CSRC)
noticed the pervasiveness of this type of tunneling practice and ofﬁcially named it as a “Non-Operational Fund Occupancy” problem
(hereafter NOFO). The CSRC explicitly identiﬁed NOFO as an illegal act that hurts minority shareholder interest. Therefore, NOFO is an
unambiguous measure of the expropriation of minority shareholders and has been widely used as a convenient way of tunneling by
the controlling shareholders in China.
Before 2005, the NOFO amounts were usually included in the balance sheet item “other receivables3”, and therefore, investors and
researchers alike have been unable to calculate NOFO balances over large samples of ﬁrms. However, in January 2006, the CSRC
required all listed ﬁrms to disclose in detail the amount of NOFO in their 2005 audited annual reports, which enables us to collect
theNOFO balances at of the end of 2005 for a large sample of ﬁrms. In addition, together with eightMinistries, the CSRC issued several
regulations in 2006, which required controlling shareholders to solve the NOFO problem before the end of 2006.4
Themost heavy-handedmeasures taken by the CSRCwith regard to NOFO came inmid-2006. OnMay 26, 2006, the CSRC issued a
regulation5 that clearly required the chairmen of the boards of listed ﬁrms to be held personally responsible for NOFO clearance6 and
also clariﬁed the responsibility of the controlling shareholders and the listed ﬁrms in these efforts. Then, on June 1, 2006, both the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges issued a regulation7 that required listed ﬁrms to continuously update their NOFO balances
to the public media. The stock exchanges also began to disclose the names of the persons responsible for the NOFO problem (usually
the chairman of the board of the controlling shareholder) to major public media.
Thus, the mandated and audited disclosures of the NOFO amounts and the May 26 and June 1, 2006 regulations offer us an excel-
lent opportunity to directly and unambiguously measure the existence and magnitude of controlling shareholder tunneling, investi-
gate the determinants of NOFO problems and examine the economic consequences of these remedying acts.
We hand-collected the reported NOFO information at the end of 2005. Among the 1308 listed ﬁrms that existed at the end of 2005,
374 ﬁrms reported positive amounts of NOFO. For these 374 ﬁrms, on average, NOFO amounts to 8.6% of their total assets. That is, for a
ﬁrm that reported 100 RMB in assets, 8.6 RMB in cash assets were not used for the ﬁrm's operational activities but were expropriated
by the largest shareholder.
We executed a series of tests using the information related to NOFO. Our ﬁrst set of tests examines whether ownership structure,
corporate governance or institutional environment factors affects controlling shareholder tunneling through NOFO. The evidence
indicates that the shareholding of the controlling shareholders and the relative controlling power of controlling shareholders versus
minority block shareholders are positively related toNOFO. Firmswith lower institutional shareholdings andwith higher agency costs
are more likely to tunnel through NOFO. In addition, ﬁrms that went public after 2001 under the more recent IPO approval policy as
well as ﬁrms located in regions with better market development are less likely to tunnel. Our results shed light on the mechanisms
that can facilitate or restrain tunneling behavior.
Our second set of tests examines the economic consequences of tunneling. Previous studies have correlated measures of ﬁrm
performance (such as Tobin's Q) with measurements of tunneling and ﬁnd a negative relationship. This cross-sectional research
design bears the problem of endogeneity because the controlling shareholders may tunnel more frequently in situations where
ﬁrms have low growth opportunities (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Our study employs an event study method and ﬁrst examines the
short-window market reaction to regulations that intended to resolve tunneling behavior (NOFO). The event study design is more
suitable to establish a causal relationship between tunneling and ﬁrm performance.8 We ﬁnd that for ﬁrms with a NOFO problem,
the market reacts positively in a signiﬁcant way when the CSRC and the stock exchanges announced the May 26 and June 1, 2006
regulations aiming at solving the NOFO problem, indicating that NOFO indeed hurt investor value, and at the prospect of solving
the problem, investor value increased.
We then further engage in long-window event investigation that examines the long-term impact of the May 26 and June 1, 2006
regulations on listed ﬁrms.We examine operating performancemeasures, valuation and long-termmarket performance. Because the
two regulations resolved the NOFO problem for affected ﬁrms, we conjecture that ﬁrms that have had NOFO balances should enjoy
better operating performance, higher valuation and better long-termmarket performance. The empirical results support our conjec-
tures. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms with NOFO problems improved their operating performance after 2005, increased their valuation and also
enjoyed better stock performance, suggesting that tunneling throughNOFOwas detrimental to listedﬁrms and that the strengthening
of minority shareholder protection is beneﬁcial to long-run ﬁrm performance. We further ﬁnd that the improvement of accounting
2 See Appendix I of Jiang et al. (2010).
3 Receivables arising from normal business transactions were recorded in the balance sheet item “account receivables”.
4 Theway to solve the NOFO problem includes (1) controlling shareholders paying back the loans in cash, and/or (2) controlling shareholders giving us equity shares
with market value equivalent to the loan balance.
5 The regulation is “Notice on examining the status and the clearance schedule of NOFO”.
6 The severity of this regulation should not be underestimated. Although the NOFO problem is a ﬁrm act, this new regulation holds the chairman of the board per-
sonally accountable. A few chairmen went into jail when controlling shareholders did not solve the NOFO problem by the end of 2006.
7 The regulation is “Notice on the clearance of NOFO of large shareholders and their subsidiaries.”
8 Bae et al. (2002) examine the market reaction to intergroup mergers. They use the negative market reaction as evidence that intergroup mergers can be used as a
means of tunneling. In contrast, we ﬁrst identify an explicit tunneling practice and then examine its economic consequences in an event study.
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performancemainly occurs in ﬁrms that are located in regionswith less-developedmarket systems, suggesting that the strengthened
protection of minority shareholders has a stronger marginal effect when the market mechanism is weaker.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature on tunneling and introduce the
institutional background. In Section 3, we present our data and empirical analyses. Section 4 concludes our paper.
2. Literature review and institutional background
2.1. The literature on tunneling
In recent years, a great amount of research effort has been dedicated to the agency problem that has arisen from the presence of a
controlling shareholder in corporations. As documented by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), concentrated ownership is commonplace
outside the U.S. and Japan. While concentrated ownership alleviates the traditional agency problem between diffused shareholders
andmanagers, it creates a conﬂict of interest between the controlling shareholder andminority shareholders. In particular, controlling
shareholders practice tunneling behavior that diverts resources out of the listed companies that they control (Johnson et al., 2000).
Prior studies have identiﬁed various forms of tunneling, including advantageous transfer pricing to parties related to the controlling
shareholders, excessive compensation, loan guarantees for controlling shareholders, inter-corporate loans and expropriation of the
corporation's business opportunities, among others (see Faccio et al., 2001; Jiang et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999).
Although extant evidence of tunneling is abundant, it tends to be indirect because a common difﬁculty of empirical research in this
area is directly identifying andmeasuring the nature andmagnitude of tunneling (Atanasov et al., 2008). As a result, most researchers
cannot directly observe tunneling and have to rely on indirect measurements.
One group of studies examines the premiums paid by the controlling shareholders for voting rights (so called “private beneﬁts of
control”) and uses the premiums as evidence of possible tunneling activities (see, for example, Zingales, 1994; Claessens et al., 2002;
Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Although these studies established the existence of tunneling activities and the importance
of legal and extra-legal mechanisms, they do not identify speciﬁc ways of tunneling through which the beneﬁts of minority share-
holders are diverted to controlling shareholders.
Another group of studies tries to identify a speciﬁc type of transaction that is susceptible to tunneling and link it to ﬁrm perfor-
mance or corporate governance. The transactions that have been examined in the literature include within-group mergers (Bae
et al., 2002), private securities offerings to group members (Baek et al., 2006), loan guarantees to related parties (Berkman et al.,
2009) and related party transactions between controlling shareholders and listed ﬁrms (Cheung et al., 2006; Jian and Wong,
2010).9 However, although these transactions could beused asmeans of tunneling, they could also be normal operational transactions
within a business group. For example, a vertically integrated ﬁrm group should have many inter-group transactions, and whether
these transactions can be identiﬁed as tunneling behaviors depends on the transfer prices. Moreover, even if these transactions are
identiﬁed as tunneling activities, the actual beneﬁts that controlling shareholders have tunneled from listed ﬁrms cannot be clearly
measured.10 As a result, this group of studies infers the nature and magnitude of tunneling from stock price reactions around the
announcements of the aforementioned transactions.
Jiang et al. (2010) attempt to examine a direct measure of tunneling, namely the inter-corporate loans that listed companies
extended to their controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries. However, Jiang et al. (2010) do not have a precise measurement
of the inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders and rely on a proxy based on a balance sheet item entitled “other receivables.”
As noticed by the authors, not all of the “other receivables” listed are inter-corporate loans to large shareholders.
Our paper extends the research by Jiang et al. (2010). Although closely related, our paper is different from this research in several
important aspects: First, we examine the NOFO problem, while Jiang et al. (2010) focus on inter-corporate loans. An inter-corporate
loan is an important component of – but is not equivalent to – the ofﬁcially deﬁned and audited NOFO. Second, our paper uses a direct
disclosure of NOFO amounts by the listed ﬁrms, while Jiang et al. (2010) rely on other receivables as a proxy. Although much of the
other receivables can be attributed to controlling shareholder tunneling, Jiang et al. (2010) indicate that some of these receivables
are not attributable to the controlling shareholders; therefore, the measurement has noise. Third, our examination of restraints on
tunneling is more thorough.We examinemore variables that more accurately depict the ownership structure aswell as the corporate
governance and the institutional environments of the listed ﬁrms. Fourth, we carry out a more powerful test of the causal effect of
tunneling on ﬁrm performance using an event study research design. Fifth, Jiang et al. (2010) discussed the regulation policies on
the NOFO problem but did not empirically test the effects. We empirically examine the market effect of regulations aiming at solving
the NOFO problem. In summary, our paper extends the research by Jiang et al. (2010) and provides more direct evidence on ofﬁcially
identiﬁed tunneling activity.
2.2. The institutional background
The Chinese stock market was established in the early 1990s by the Chinese government. There are two stock exchanges: one
located in Shanghai (created in 1990) and one located in Shenzhen (created in 1991). The Chinese stockmarket has rapidly developed
in the last 20 years and has grown into one of the largest stock markets in the world. At the end of 2010, the number of listed ﬁrms
reached 2022 and the total market capitalization reached 27 trillion RMB.
9 Bae et al. (2012) directly link the incentive of expropriation with stock performance.
10 For example, it is difﬁcult to measure the actual beneﬁt that the controlling shareholders receive from the loan guarantees to related parties.
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During this rapid process of development, the Chinese stock market has been severely plagued by the problem of controlling
shareholder tunneling. As Jiang et al. (2010) indicated, three factors have contributed to the pervasive existence of controlling share-
holder tunneling. First, almost all of the listed ﬁrms have a controlling shareholder. Most of the listed ﬁrms are carve-outs or spin-offs
of an existing business group. The regulatory institution, the CSRC, has set strict listing requirements, such as accounting performance,
the percentage of IPO shares, the size of the IPO, etc. As a result, a business group usually carves out one of its most proﬁtable parts to
list. In addition, the publicly ﬂoated shares in an IPO are typically less than 30% of the total shares,11 and therefore, the business group
retains a substantial shareholding and controlling stake in the newly listed ﬁrm.
Second, for listed ﬁrms, the CSRC created a complex classiﬁcation system of share structure. Common stocks are divided into
tradable and non-tradable shares. Tradable shares are owned by individual or institutional investors and can be freely traded in
stock exchanges. Non-tradable shares are owned by the government, state agencies or other legal entities, and cannot be publicly
traded on the open market.12 The shares retained by the controlling shareholder belong to the non-tradable share category and
face severe trading restrictions. Therefore, the controlling shareholder has a limited ability to beneﬁt from the price appreciation of
the shares that they own, which harms the incentive to improve the operating performance of listed ﬁrms while simultaneously
increasing the incentive to tunnel from the listed ﬁrm.
Third, the institutional environments and legal protections are under-developed in China and cannot effectively restrain tunneling
behavior. The formal corporate governancemechanismwas not introduced until 2002. External governancemechanisms (such as take-
overmarkets or other forms of investor activism) are almost non-existent. The legal protection of minority shareholders is weak (Allen
et al., 2005), and minority shareholders have limited resources with which to seek retribution when their interest is harmed.
Taken together, a dominant shareholder without ways to beneﬁt from share price appreciation and a weak institutional environ-
ment that does not restrain the shareholder's actions (that are harmful tominority shareholders) have led to severe controlling share-
holder tunneling problems in China. Many controlling shareholders chose the most convenient and direct channel to embezzle the
funds of listed ﬁrms. For example, as Jiang et al. (2010) document, controlling shareholders used inter-corporate loans to divert
billions of RMB in cash from listed ﬁrms to themselves. These inter-corporate loans involved no operational transactions, bore little
interest and were seldom returned prior to 2006when the central government ﬁnally decided to crack down on this problem during
the process of Share Reform.
In fact, beginning in 2003, the CSRC realized the severity of the tunneling problem and decided to solve it. Becausemany tunneling
channels (such as asset transfers at prices favoring the controlling shareholder) are difﬁcult to identify, the CSRC decided to address
the most evident channel. In November 2005, the CSRC issued a regulation entitled “Focus on the Solution of the problem of Non-
Operational Fund Occupancy,”which clearly deﬁned Non-Operational Fund Occupancy as tunneling. According to the ofﬁcial regula-
tion, the following transactions are included inNOFO: (1) the funds that listedﬁrmshave paid forwage expenses, insurance expenses,
advertising expenses and other expenses on behalf of the controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries; (2) the funds that listed
ﬁrms have paid for the debts of the controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries; (3) direct or indirect loans from listed ﬁrms to
the controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries; (4) the debt obligations due to loan guarantees for the controlling shareholders
and their subsidiaries; and (5) other funds that listed ﬁrms have provided to controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries without
receiving commodities or services.13
The CSRC then issued a series of important regulations that required listed ﬁrms to resolve the NOFO problem. In November 2005,
the CSRC issued the “Opinion on Improving Listed Firms Quality” together with the Chinese State Council, the highest administrative
institution, which clearly required listed ﬁrms to resolve NOFO problems before the end of 2006 and required that each ﬁrm should
propose a clear plan and a time schedule for its resolution procedure. The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges then required that
listed ﬁrms disclose their NOFO amounts and their schedules of resolution procedures in their 2005 annual reports.
Themost heavy-handedmeasures taken by the CSRC on theNOFO problem came in 2006. OnMay 26, 2006, the CSRC issued a reg-
ulation that clearly required the chairman of the board of the controlling shareholder to be held personally responsible for the NOFO
clearance and also clariﬁed the responsibility of the controlling shareholders and the listed ﬁrms. Then, on June 1, 2006, both the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges issued a regulation that required listed ﬁrms to continuously update their NOFO balances.
The stock exchanges also began to disclose to major public media outlets the names of the persons responsible for the NOFO
problem. Dyck et al. (2008) note that media coverage can be an effective corporate governance mechanism when the legal system
is not well developed. Themedia exposure could affect the reputation of, and could impose large pressure on, the responsible individ-
uals and could therefore increase their incentives to solve the NOFO problem.
In 2006, the Chinese regulator also initiated the split-share structure reform,which transformed non-tradable shares into tradable
shares and therefore allowed controlling shareholders to trade their shares in stock exchanges (see Li et al., 2011). This reform tied the
interests of controlling shareholders andminority shareholdersmore closely together and greatly reduced the incentives of tunneling.
The existence and disclosure of NOFO activities and the series of regulations to counter this tunneling problem offer a great oppor-
tunity to study the nature and extent of tunneling behavior, to examine its economic consequences and to investigate the effective-
ness of various forms of corporate governance mechanisms. In particular, the requirement of detailed disclosure about NOFO enables
us to collect information about an explicit and ofﬁcially conﬁrmed tunneling activity directly from public sources. Therefore, ourmea-
surement of tunneling has advantages over measurements used in prior literature: it is a direct measure (versus a proxy) of explicit
tunneling (versus related party transactions that can only be considered tunneling based on market reactions).
11 The percentage of IPO shares can be as low as 5% of the total shares.
12 Before 2005, the non-tradable shares could only be traded through a speciﬁc arrangement of block transfers. See Huang and Xu (2009).
13 As we can see, inter-corporate loan to large shareholders is one category of NOFO.
298 G. Jiang et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 32 (2015) 295–311
3. Data and empirical tests
3.1. Sample and variable description
We hand-collected NOFO information from audited annual reports from the year 2005 of ﬁrms listed in the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Securities Exchanges. Financial, market return and ownership data are extracted from the CSMAR database.14 To be includ-
ed in our sample, aﬁrmmust have necessary ﬁnancial andmarket information for our analyses. Following extant studies, we delete all
ﬁrms from the ﬁnancial sector. Our ﬁnal sample consists of 1308 listed ﬁrms, of which 374 ﬁrms (28.6%) disclosed that they have
NOFO problems and the amount of NOFO, while other ﬁrms (71.4%) indicated that they have no NOFO problem.15
Themain variables of our analyses are NOFOTA (NOFOdivided by total assets), andDNOFO (adummy variable that takes a value of
1 if a ﬁrm reported a positive amount of NOFO in 2005, and 0 otherwise). The summary statistics in Panel A, Table 1 show that among
the 374 ﬁrms that reported a positive amount of NOFO, the mean (median) NOFOTA is 8.6% (2.1%). Considering that NOFO is the
amount of cash assets taken away from a ﬁrm, its economic impact on the ﬁrm's operation is signiﬁcant.
The ﬁrst set of tests aims at investigating the determinants of the NOFO problem.We identify the following variables of ﬁrm char-
acteristics as candidates that depictﬁrms' ownership structure, the level of effectiveness of corporate governance and the institutional
environments in which the ﬁrms operate.
FIRST is the percentage of shares held by the controlling shareholder, and SECFIV is the sumof the percentages of shares held by the
second- to the ﬁfth-largest shareholders. We also deﬁne FSR as FIRST divided by SECFIV tomeasure the relative ownership advantage
of the controlling shareholder over other major shareholders. Bae et al. (2012) suggest that managerial expropriation power affects
the stock performance. Pagano and Roell (1998) and Lins (2003) ﬁnd that major non-controlling shareholders canmonitor the activ-
ities of controlling shareholders through collective action. Jiang and Kim (2015) ﬁnd that the balance between controlling share-
holders and other large shareholders is associated with higher ﬁrm performance.
We include a dummy variable STATE to measure whether the controlling shareholder is the state (including government agencies,
state-controlled ﬁrms, or other state agencies). A non-state controlling shareholder can directly beneﬁt from the NOFO by putting the
money into their own pocket, while a state controlling shareholder has difﬁculties in personally capturing monetary beneﬁts (Bai
et al., 2013; Jiang and Kim, 2015). Therefore, the non-state controlling shareholders should have stronger incentives to tunnel.
Following Fan et al. (2007), we include the number of intermediate layers between the listed ﬁrm and its controlling owner through
the longest pyramidal chain (LAYER). More complex control structures obscure inter-ﬁrm relationships and may facilitate tunneling
behaviors.
Tomeasure the effectiveness of corporate governancemechanisms, we include the following variables. MEETING is the number of
board meetings in a ﬁscal year. A high frequency of board meetings indicates that board members devote more time and effort to
monitoring the ﬁrm, therefore reducing unethical ﬁrm behavior (Vafeas, 1999). INDDIR is the ratio of independent directors on a
board. Klein (2002) ﬁnds that boards of directors are more effective in monitoring managers' ﬁnancial reporting behavior if there
are more independent directors. BOARD is the number of directors on the board. As Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue, a small
board could improve the board's efﬁciency because having various directors from diverse backgrounds may lead to conﬂicts.
MSHARE is the percentage of shares held by themanagement. Prior studies use the shareholding of themanagement team tomeasure
the alignment of themanagerial interest with that of the shareholders (Murphy, 1999). DUAL is a dummyvariable indicatingwhether
the chairman of the board is also the CEO. Liu and Lu (2007) ﬁnd higher earnings management behavior when the CEO is also the
board chair. INST is the percentage of tradable shares held by institutional investors. Large institutional investors have advantages
in the access to ﬁrm information (Ke and Ramalingegowda, 2005) and also inﬂuence ﬁrms' corporate decisions through their repre-
sentatives on the board or through other forms of access. BIG4 indicateswhether the auditor hired by theﬁrm is one of the four largest
accounting ﬁrms. Large accounting ﬁrms have a stronger incentive to maintain high audit quality than do small accounting ﬁrms due
to the greater concern of large ﬁrms about their reputations (DeAngelo, 1981; DeFond et al., 1999).
Dyck and Zingales (2004) suggest thatmanagers tend to assist in the process of large-shareholder tunneling. Therefore, the greater
the conﬂict of interest between managers and shareholders, the more likely it is that managers will help controlling shareholders to
tunnel. We include the variable AGENCY to measure the agency cost between managers and shareholders, which follows the proce-
dure of Ang et al. (2000) and is deﬁned as the income statement item General and Administrative Expenses deﬂated by total assets.
Political connections that the controlling shareholder enjoys may offer better protection to the shareholder after engaging in illegit-
imate activities; thus, we include PC, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the chairman of the board or the CEO has
work experience in the government or the military.
Finally, we include two variables that depict the institutional environment of the Chinese stock market. The ﬁrst one is a dummy
variable POLICY, which takes a value of 1 if a ﬁrm's IPO took place after the year 2001, and 0 otherwise. Prior to 2001, the CSRC set a
strict and scarce quota to control the number and amount of offerings of IPOs. To meet the quota requirements, Chinese controlling
shareholders tended to carve out and package their best subsets to be listed and bear all of the policy burdens, such as retired em-
ployees, hospitals and schools, of the remaining parent group. Therefore, the controlling parent group had strong incentives to receive
compensation from the listed ﬁrms after the IPO (Aharony et al., 2010). The system was changed in 2001 from a quota system to an
approval system, and the quota requirements were abolished. Therefore, ﬁrms listed after 2001 may suffer less of the distorted
14 We thank Nianhang Xu for sharing data on political connections.
15 Because the CSRC has noticed theNOFO problem since 2003 andmade numerous attempts to solve the problem, some controlling shareholdersmay have returned
the funds to listed ﬁrms prior to 2005. For more details, see Jiang et al. (2010).
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incentive problem of tunneling. The second one is MKT, a comprehensive index measuring a region's (where a listed ﬁrm is
headquartered) market development progress (Fan and Wang, 2006). A higher value of MKT means that the region is more market
friendly and better protects property rights.
The second set of tests examines the effects of regulations to remedy the NOFO problem. First, we examine themarket reaction to
theMay 26, and June 1, 2006 announcements of regulations thatmandate the resolution of the NOFO problem. To capture themarket
reactions to the announcements, we compute, for each ﬁrm, the 3-day window cumulative abnormal returns surrounding May 26,
2006 (CAR_526), and surrounding June 1, 2006 (CAR_61). Second, in regression analyses, we examine performance changes due to
the resolution of the NOFO problem in which we use all ﬁrm-year observations from 2004 to 2008, using a dummy variable POST
to indicate whether a ﬁrm-year observation is from the 2004–2005 period (POST = 0) or from the 2006–2008 period (POST = 1).
The dependent variables in these operating performance regressions are ROA, or return on assets, deﬁned as earnings before extraor-
dinary items divided by total assets; ROE, or return on equity, deﬁned as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total equity;
and TobinQ, which is the sum of the market value of tradable shares, the book value of non-tradable shares and the book value of
debts divided by total assets.
In subsequent regression analyses, the following control variables are used. SIZE is the natural logarithmof aﬁrm's total assets;MV
is the natural logarithm of a ﬁrm'smarket capitalization; LEV is a ﬁrm's leverage, deﬁned as total liabilities divided by total assets; and
PPE is the property, plants and equipment, divided by total assets. We include all variable deﬁnitions in Appendix I.
Table 1
Summary statistics of the sample ﬁrms.
Variables Obs MEAN STD P25 MEDIAN P75
Panel A: Year 2005 sample of unique ﬁrms
NOFOTA 374 0.086 0.158 0.003 0.021 0.083
DNOFO 1308 0.286 0.452 0 0 1
FIRST 1308 0.422 0.160 0.290 0.402 0.559
SECFIV 1308 0.157 0.126 0.048 0.121 0.257
FSR 1308 12.710 24.860 1.197 3.079 11.260
STATE 1308 0.707 0.455 0 1 1
LAYER 1308 2.351 0.893 2 2 3
MEETING 1308 7.434 2.891 6 7 9
INDDIR 1308 0.344 0.051 0.333 0.333 0.364
BOARD 1308 9.670 2.097 9 9 11
MSHARE 1308 0.010 0.053 0 0 0
DUAL 1308 0.098 0.297 0 0 0
INST 1308 9.517 15.510 0.147 1.499 12.190
BIG4 1308 0.069 0.253 0 0 0
AGENCY 1308 0.057 0.047 0.027 0.045 0.071
PC 1308 0.292 0.455 0 0 1
POLICY 1308 0.239 0.427 0 0 0
MKT 1308 7.237 1.664 6.250 6.970 8.970
CAR_526 1193 0.000 0.058 −0.033 −0.005 0.027
CAR_61 1196 −0.001 0.071 −0.048 −0.007 0.039
ASSET (in million RMB) 1308 3583.691 16,189.310 854.759 1554.101 3193.090
ROA 1308 0.014 0.086 −0.002 0.024 0.056
SIZE 1308 21.250 0.990 20.570 21.160 21.880
MV 1290 20.880 0.857 20.290 20.740 21.330
LEV 1308 0.542 0.256 0.392 0.530 0.652
Panel B: Sample of ﬁrm-years between 2004 and 2008
NOFOTA 5830 0.020 0.071 0 0 0.001
DNOFO 5830 0.281 0.449 0 0 1
POST 5830 0.599 0.490 0 1 1
ROA 5830 0.023 0.078 0.002 0.026 0.060
ROE 5830 0.047 0.252 0.009 0.060 0.131
TobinQ 5830 1.474 0.779 1.063 1.205 1.567
FIRST 5830 29.583 20.343 15.250 29.280 45.397
SECFIV 5830 15.461 11.846 5.480 12.740 23.870
STATE 5830 0.684 0.465 0 1 1
MKT 5830 7.760 1.893 6.360 7.860 9.390
SIZE 5830 21.391 1.059 20.680 21.332 22.028
MV 5830 21.431 1.057 20.647 21.275 22.032
LEV 5830 0.538 0.278 0.388 0.528 0.647
PPE 5830 0.309 0.186 0.165 0.285 0.438
MB 5830 2.900 3.250 1.317 1.982 3.469
This table presents summary statistics of sample ﬁrms in year 2005 (Panel A), and sample of ﬁrm-years used in regression analyses between 2004 and 2008 (Panel B).
Panel A sample include 1308 unique listed ﬁrms, among which 374 ﬁrms reported Non-Operational Fund Occupancy in 2005 annual reports. The Panel B samples
include, depending on data availability, at most 5830 ﬁrm-year observations of the 1308 unique ﬁrms between 2004 and 2008. See Appendix I for variable deﬁnitions.
All continuous variables at ﬁrm-level are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
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In PanelAof Table 1,wepresent descriptive statistics for variables used to examine thedeterminants ofNOFO. The information is based
on the annual reports fromﬁscal year 2005.We use ﬁve variables depicting the ownership structure of theﬁrms. On average, the percent-
age of shares held by the controlling shareholders (FIRST) is 0.422, indicating that most of ﬁrms have concentrated ownership structures.
The average sum of the percentage of shares held by the second- to ﬁfth-largest shareholders (SECFIV) is 0.157, and the average ratio of
FIRST to SECFIV (FSR) is 12.710, suggesting that other blockminority shareholders have relatively low bargaining power with controlling
shareholders. STATE is a dummy for state ownership, which takes a value of 1 if the controlling shareholder is a state-owned institution or
a state-owned ﬁrm. The STATEmean of 0.707 suggests thatmost of our sampleﬁrms remain controlled by the state. The average number
of intermediate layers between the company and its controlling owner through the longest pyramidal chain (Layer) is 2.351.
For the governance variables, the average number of boardmeetings (MEETING) is 7.434, and the average number of directors on
the board (BOARD) is 9.67. The average ratio of independent directors on the board (INDDIR) is 0.344, and most of the ﬁrms have
independent directors on the board that representmore than one-third of the total number of boardmembers, which is the ratio sug-
gested by the regulator. Approximately 9.8% of ﬁrms have chairmen of the board who are also CEOs (Dual). The shareholding of the
boardmembers andmanagement teams (MSHARE) is approximately 1%, suggesting thatmost senior executives have little ownership
of the listed ﬁrms. The average shareholding of institutional investors (INST) is 9.517%, and 75% of ﬁrms have institutional investors
representing less than 12.19% of the total investors, indicating that institutional investors still have a limited inﬂuence in major
corporate decision making. BIG4 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the auditor of the ﬁrm is one of the Big 4 international
accounting ﬁrms, and 0 otherwise. The average of BIG4 is 0.069. General and Administrative Expenses (AGENCY)make up 5.7% of the
total assets on average. PC is a dummy variable thatmeasureswhether theﬁrmhas a political connection, and it indicates that 29.2% of
ﬁrms have established political connections.
Themarketization index (MKT)measures themarket development of the province inwhich the listed ﬁrm is located. Themean of
the marketization index is 7.237, and the inter-quartile range is 2.72 (8.97–6.25), indicating a large variance of market development
across Chinese regions. POLICY is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if theﬁrm's IPOwas introduced after 2001, and 0 otherwise.
The mean value of 0.239 of POLICY indicates that 23.9% of ﬁrms have IPOs that began after 2001.
The average total assets (ASSET) are 3584million RMB, and the return on assets (ROA) has amean of 0.014 and amedian of 0.024.
The average total liability is 54.2% of total assets (LEV).
In Panel B of Table 1, we present descriptive statistics for variables that we use to test the long-term effects of regulations that aim
to remedyNOFO problems. Our sample period covers the years 2004 to 2008. The information regardingNOFOTA andDNOFO is based
on a 2005 annual report. Other variables are achieved every year. POST is a dummy variable that indicates whether the observation is
from before ﬁscal year 2005. For observations from ﬁscal years 2004 and 2005, POST equals 0; for observations from ﬁscal years 2006,
2007 and 2008, POST equals 1. We winsorized all continuous variables at 1% and 99% to avoid the inﬂuence of outliers.
Table 2
Comparisons between NOFO and Non-NOFO ﬁrms.






FIRST 0.420 0.429 −0.89
SECFIV 0.159 0.152 0.83
FSR 11.273 16.610 −3.47⁎⁎⁎
STATE 0.694 0.740 −1.66
LAYER 2.342 2.361 −0.34
MEETING 7.425 7.440 −0.08
INDDIR 0.345 0.340 1.64
BOARD 9.696 9.585 0.86
MSHARE 0.014 0.001 3.93⁎⁎⁎
DUAL 0.102 0.090 0.63
INST 11.353 5.161 6.54⁎⁎⁎
BIG4 0.082 0.036 2.99⁎⁎⁎
AGENCY 0.052 0.069 −5.96⁎⁎⁎
PC 0.276 0.331 −1.95⁎
POLICY 0.286 0.128 6.03⁎⁎⁎
MKT 7.394 6.832 5.54⁎⁎⁎
SIZE 21.302 21.113 3.11⁎⁎⁎
MV 20.975 20.652 6.19⁎⁎⁎
MB 1.706 1.663 0.45
PPE 0.326 0.324 0.16
LEV 0.513 0.630 −6.56⁎⁎⁎
ROA 0.030 −0.029 10.77⁎⁎⁎
ROE 0.054 −0.040 4.68⁎⁎⁎
NOFO is the amount of non-operational fund that controlling shareholders take away from listed ﬁrms without matching business transactions.
DNOFO is adummyvariable that takes a value of 1 if aﬁrmreported apositive amount ofNOFO in the2005 annual report, and0otherwise. t-Statistics
that test the difference of variables between these two types of ﬁrms are reported in the last column. See Appendix I for variable deﬁnitions.
⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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3.2. Univariate analysis: NOFO ﬁrms vs. Non-NOFO ﬁrms
We ﬁrst compare different characteristics between ﬁrms with a NOFO problem (NOFO ﬁrms) and ﬁrms without a NOFO
problem (Non-NOFO ﬁrms). The results are presented in Table 2. Compared to Non-NOFO ﬁrms, NOFO ﬁrms' largest share-
holders hold more shares (42.9% vs. 42.0%), and their second- to ﬁfth-largest shareholders hold fewer shares (15.2% vs.
15.9%), although their differences are statistically insigniﬁcant. There is a signiﬁcant difference in FSR between NOFO ﬁrms
and Non-NOFO ﬁrms, which suggests that in NOFO ﬁrms, the largest shareholders have relatively greater controlling rights
than other minority block shareholders.
Some signiﬁcant differences exist between the two groups. The shareholdings of board members are signiﬁcantly higher in
Non-NOFO ﬁrms than those in NOFO ﬁrms (1.4% vs. 0.1%), but the percentages are low in both groups. Institutional investors
prefer to hold more shares of Non-NOFO ﬁrms (11.353% vs. 5.161%), suggesting that professional investors may have noticed
the tunneling problem and avoided those ﬁrms. Non-NOFO ﬁrms are more likely to hire reputable auditing ﬁrms (BIG4 = 0.082
vs. 0.036) and to have lower agency costs (AGENCY = 0.052 vs. 0.069), and they are less likely to establish political connections
(PC = 0.276 vs. 0.331). In addition, Non-NOFO ﬁrms are more likely to be located in regions with more-developed markets
(MKT = 7.394 for Non-NOFO ﬁrms vs. 6.832 for NOFO ﬁrms) and are more likely to have been listed after the new IPO policy was
instituted (0.286 vs. 0.128). These differences are consistent with our hypotheses. Furthermore, Non-NOFO ﬁrms have higher proﬁts
and lower leverage ratios.
In Table 3, we present the correlations between ourmain variables. An examination of the correlationmatrix indicates that except
for the correlations between three ownership variables (FIRST, SECFIV and FSR), the other correlations are generally small, suggesting
that collinearity is not a serious issue.
3.3. Regression analysis of factors affecting NOFO
We now turn to investigate the factors that affect NOFO using the following cross-sectional Probit model.








where the dependent dummy variable is DNOFO, which takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm has a NOFO problem and 0 otherwise. The Own-
ership variables include FIRST (the shareholding of the controlling shareholder), SECFIV (the sum of shareholdings of the second- to
ﬁfth-largest shareholders), FSR (the ratio of FIRST to SECFIV), STATE (a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the controlling share-
holder is state-owned, and 0 otherwise) and Layer (the number of intermediate layers between the listed ﬁrm and its controlling
owner through the longest pyramidal chain). The corporate governance variables include MEETING (the number of board meetings),
INDDIR (the percentage of independent directors), BOARD (the number of board members), Dual (a dummy variable that takes a
value of 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board), INST (the shareholding of institutional investors), BIG4 (a dummy variable
for the Big 4 international auditors), AGENCY (the ratio of General and Administrative Expenses over total assets) and PC
Table 3
Correlation matrix of main variables.
NOFOTA DNOFO FIRST SECFIV FSR STATE LAYER MEETING INDDIR
DNOFO 0.453⁎⁎⁎
FIRST 0.006 −0.007
SECFIV −0.043 −0.021 −0.604⁎⁎⁎
FSR 0.083⁎⁎⁎ 0.094⁎⁎⁎ 0.518⁎⁎⁎ −0.499⁎⁎⁎
STATE −0.029⁎⁎ 0.042⁎⁎⁎ 0.154⁎⁎⁎ −0.186⁎⁎⁎ 0.163⁎⁎⁎
LAYER 0.051⁎ 0.013 0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.045 0.017 −0.022
MEETING −0.014 0.009 −0.005 −0.003 −0.005 −0.056⁎⁎ 0.034
INDDIR −0.01 −0.041 −0.03 −0.021 0.035 −0.102⁎⁎⁎ −0.064⁎⁎ 0.017
BOARD −0.079⁎⁎⁎ −0.025 −0.009 0.087⁎⁎⁎ −0.072⁎⁎⁎ 0.173⁎⁎⁎ 0.013 −0.007 −0.199⁎⁎⁎
MSHARE −0.052⁎ −0.109⁎⁎⁎ −0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.111⁎⁎⁎ −0.074⁎⁎⁎ −0.242⁎⁎⁎ −0.296⁎⁎⁎ −0.03 0.065⁎⁎
DUAL 0.017 −0.02 −0.029 0.031 −0.01 −0.048⁎ −0.008 −0.051⁎ 0.059⁎⁎
INST −0.147⁎⁎⁎ −0.177⁎⁎⁎ 0.110⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎ −0.157⁎⁎⁎ 0.061⁎⁎ −0.033 0.012 −0.066⁎⁎
BIG4 −0.065⁎⁎ −0.078⁎⁎⁎ 0.087⁎⁎⁎ 0.024 −0.037 0.069⁎⁎ 0.059⁎⁎ 0.048⁎ −0.052⁎
AGENCY 0.318⁎⁎⁎ 0.165⁎⁎⁎ −0.085⁎⁎⁎ 0.047⁎ −0.048⁎ −0.066⁎⁎ 0.097⁎⁎⁎ 0.01 −0.026
PC 0.042 0.059⁎⁎ 0.009 0.015 0.011 0.136⁎⁎⁎ −0.017 0.029 −0.012
POLICY −0.132⁎⁎⁎ −0.169⁎⁎⁎ 0.065⁎⁎ 0.094⁎⁎⁎ −0.098⁎⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.128⁎⁎⁎ −0.036 0.009
SIZE −0.194⁎⁎⁎ −0.122⁎⁎⁎ 0.202⁎⁎⁎ −0.188⁎⁎⁎ 0.085⁎⁎⁎ 0.264⁎⁎⁎ −0.004 0.080⁎⁎⁎ −0.066⁎⁎
LEV 0.270⁎⁎⁎ 0.172⁎⁎⁎ −0.057⁎⁎⁎ 0.011 −0.052⁎ −0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.069⁎⁎ 0.067⁎⁎ 0.009
This table reports the correlations between our main variables. See Appendix I for variable deﬁnitions.
⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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(a dummy variable for political connection). We also include MKT (the marketization index) and POLICY (a dummy variable for IPO
policy) as institution variables in the Probit model. Furthermore, we control SIZE (logistics of total assets) and LEV (the total liabilities
over total assets) in the model. All of these variables are measured at the end of 2005 and deﬁned in the table in Appendix I. We also
control industry-ﬁxed effects.
The results of the Probit regressionmodel are presented in Table 4. Inmodel 1, we include both the shareholdings of the con-
trolling shareholders (FIRST) and the shareholdings held by the second- to ﬁfth-largest shareholders (SECFIV). The coefﬁcient
of FIRST (0.750) is positive and signiﬁcant at 5%, suggesting that greater shareholdings of controlling shareholders lead to
greater instances of tunneling through NOFO. The coefﬁcient of SECFIV is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that other block shareholders
do not have the power to constrain tunneling (NOFO) by the controlling shareholder. In model 2, we replace FIRST and SECFIV
with FSR (FIRST-to-SECFIV ratio). The positively signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of FSR (0.003) in model 2 is consistent with the notion
that the dominant bargaining power of the controlling shareholder over minority shareholders leads to tunneling through
NOFO.
STATE is not signiﬁcant in model 1 or model 2, suggesting that the state-owned controlling shareholders are less likely to tunnel
through NOFO. To our surprise, the coefﬁcients of Layer are negative, though insigniﬁcant. We conjecture that when there are more
layers between controlling shareholders and the listed ﬁrm, it is more likely that the listed ﬁrm is in a large ﬁrm group. Therefore, the
controlling shareholders have more ways other than NOFO to tunnel the listed ﬁrms and reduce their use of NOFO.
We further check the relationship between NOFO and corporate governance components to investigate which factors
can constrain the NOFO practices of the largest shareholders in China. First, we add internal governance mechanisms, such as the
number of board meetings, the size of the board, the ratio of independent directors on the board, shareholding by management
teams and whether the chairman is also the CEO. However, only the coefﬁcient of MSHARE is signiﬁcantly negative (−5.689 in
model 1 and−5.769 in model 2, signiﬁcant at 5%). Other variables for internal corporate governance have no signiﬁcance in regres-
sion models, suggesting that in China, the internal corporate governance mechanism is not effective in restraining tunneling through
NOFO.
We next investigatewhether external corporate governance constrains the tunneling practices of the largest shareholders. The re-
sults show that INST is negative and strongly signiﬁcant (−0.014 inmodel 1 and−0.012 inmodel 2, both signiﬁcant at the 1% level),
indicating that institutional investors exert their governance role in constraining tunneling behavior. However, BIG4 is not signiﬁcant
in the regressions. The coefﬁcients of AGENCY are signiﬁcantly positive (3.762 inmodel 1 and 3.728 inmodel 2, both signiﬁcant at the
1% level), suggesting that ﬁrms with higher agency costs are more likely to tunnel through NOFO. PC is positive but insigniﬁcant,
suggesting that after controlling for other variables, political connection has no effect on NOFO.
We also investigatewhether institutional environments inﬂuence tunneling by the largest shareholders throughNOFO.MKT is sig-
niﬁcantly negative (−0.081 inmodel 1 and−0.083 inmodel 2, both signiﬁcant at the 1% level), indicating that ﬁrms in regionswhere
themarket is underdeveloped are more likely to tunnel through NOFO. This evidence is consistent with the notion that tunneling is a
more severe problem in less-developed areas of China due to weaker investor protections (Jiang et al., 2010) and is also consistent
with the cross-country ﬁndings by Nenova (2003). Moreover, POLICY is signiﬁcantly negative in the regressions (−0.444 in model
1 and−0.403 in model 2, both signiﬁcant at the 1% level), indicating that the IPO policy has a signiﬁcant impact on tunneling. The
quota policy of the early period created stronger incentives for controlling shareholders' tunneling behavior. The more recent
quality-based IPO policy alleviated the incentives of tunneling.
LEV is signiﬁcantly positive in all models, suggesting that shareholders tunnel more when the ﬁrms have more bank loans. The
evidence is consistent with Qian and Yeung (2015).




0.126⁎⁎⁎ 0.021 −0.039 0.194⁎⁎⁎
−0.068⁎⁎ 0.011 0.043 −0.046⁎ −0.043
0.025 −0.102⁎⁎⁎ −0.03 0.02 0.005 −0.023
0.059⁎⁎ 0.318⁎⁎⁎ 0.044 0.164⁎⁎⁎ 0.039 −0.053⁎ −0.069⁎⁎
0.252⁎⁎⁎ −0.101⁎⁎⁎ −0.069⁎⁎ 0.354⁎⁎⁎ 0.324⁎⁎⁎ −0.316⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎ −0.082⁎⁎⁎
−0.042 −0.088⁎⁎⁎ 0.014 −0.174⁎⁎⁎ −0.105⁎⁎⁎ 0.337⁎⁎⁎ 0.003 −0.172⁎⁎⁎ −0.115⁎⁎⁎
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In the Probit model, we measure NOFO using a dummy variable that indicates whether a ﬁrm has NOFO or not. The dummy
variable cannot capture the amount of NOFO. Therefore, we also employ a Tobit regression model to take the severity of the NOFO
problem into consideration. Our model speciﬁcation follows:









where the dependent variable NOFOTA is the actual amount of NOFO scaled by total assets, and all other variables are the same as
those in the Probit model. The results presented in Models 3 and 4 in Table 4 are similar to the results of the Probit regression
model. The results from the Tobit model conﬁrm our conclusions from the Probit model.
To summarize the results in Table 4, we ﬁnd that ownership structure, internal governance, external governance and institutional
environment all exercise some constraints on tunneling through NOFO by large shareholders, though not every mechanism is
effective. Our evidence sheds some light on the effectiveness of various governance mechanisms.
Table 4
Probit (Tobit) regression of DNOFO (NOFOTA) on ﬁrm characteristics.
Dependent variable: DNOFO Dependent variable: NOFOTA







STATE 0.131 0.145 0.021 0.025⁎
(1.32) (1.49) (−1.45) (−1.76)
LAYER −0.054 −0.047 −0.003 −0.002
(−1.13) (−0.99) (−0.47) (−0.24)
MEETING 0.010 0.011 0.000 0.000
(0.76) (0.78) (0.16) (0.17)
INDDIR −0.717 −0.791 −0.038 −0.05
(−0.87) (−0.95) (−0.39) (−0.50)
BOARD −0.006 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002
(−0.28) (−0.18) (−0.75) (−0.79)
MSHARE −5.689⁎⁎ −5.769⁎⁎ −0.981⁎⁎ −0.971⁎⁎
(−2.21) (−2.20) (−2.42) (−2.39)
DUAL −0.080 −0.078 −0.008 −0.009
(−0.61) (−0.59) (−0.45) (−0.46)
INST −0.014⁎⁎⁎ −0.012⁎⁎⁎ −0.002⁎⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎
(−3.78) (−3.30) (−3.55) (−3.00)
BIG4 −0.198 −0.157 −0.015 −0.01
(−1.06) (−0.84) (−0.66) (−0.41)
AGENCY 3.762⁎⁎⁎ 3.728⁎⁎⁎ 0.650⁎⁎⁎ 0.647⁎⁎⁎
(3.86) (3.81) (3.94) (3.96)
PC 0.127 0.129 0.020 0.02
(1.45) (1.46) (1.61) (1.61)
POLICY −0.444⁎⁎⁎ −0.403⁎⁎⁎ −0.010⁎⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎⁎
(−4.11) (−3.75) (−3.09) (−3.15)
MKT −0.081⁎⁎⁎ −0.083⁎⁎⁎ −0.071⁎⁎⁎ −0.064⁎⁎⁎
(−3.27) (−3.34) (−4.90) (−4.45)
SIZE −0.006 −0.011 −0.014⁎ −0.013
(−0.12) (−0.22) (−1.71) (−1.64)
LEV 0.598⁎⁎⁎ 0.583⁎⁎⁎ 0.152⁎⁎⁎ 0.149⁎⁎⁎
(3.30) (3.23) (4.87) (4.82)
Constant −0.359 0.081 0.162 0.192
(−0.31) (0.07) (0.89) (1.10)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs 1308 1308 1308 1308
Pseudo R2 0.120 0.120 0.498 0.497
DNOFO is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a ﬁrm reported a positive amount of NOFO in the 2005 annual report, and 0 otherwise. NOFOTA is the amount of
NOFO divided by total assets. White-adjusted z-statistics are in parentheses. See Appendix I for variable deﬁnitions. MODEL1 and MODEL2 use Probit regression.
MODEL3 and MODEL4 use Tobit regression.
⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
304 G. Jiang et al. / Journal of Corporate Finance 32 (2015) 295–311
3.4. The market reaction to remedying regulations
In this section,we use an event study design to examine the effect of regulations that aim to resolve theNOFOproblem.OnMay26,
and June 1, 2006, Chinese regulators issued two critical regulations to address the NOFO problem. The regulation issued on May 26
identiﬁed the person who should take responsibility for NOFO activities. The responsible person, usually the chairman of the control-
ling shareholding entity, would be prosecuted if the NOFO problemwas not solved in accordancewith the deadline. This regulation is
a serious threat because it pinpointed one person who has the power to solve the problem and cannot avoid the responsibility.
Furthermore, the regulation issued on June 1 exposed the responsible person to public media outlets, which therefore subjected
this person to monitoring by the press. Given the close monitoring by the press and heavy pressure from the public, the responsible
person has strong motivations to solve a NOFO problem.
It is interesting that the ﬁrst regulation relies on the formal legal system and the second relies on monitoring by the press. In the lit-
erature, both the legal system and media were found to be effective in constraining tunneling practices. For example, Djankov et al.
(2008) suggest that the legal system is an important factor that constrains self-dealing activities of controlling shareholders. Dyck
et al. (2008) use a sample of Russian ﬁrms and ﬁnd that the media plays an effective governance role when the formal legal system is
not effective. Luo et al. (2013) also document the governance effect of media in China. We hypothesize that these regulations increase
the possibility that controlling shareholders will pay back the occupied funds, which could lead to the improvement of ﬁrm performance
in later years. Therefore, we hypothesize that the market price reaction of NOFO ﬁrms will positively react to these two regulations.
To test this hypothesis, we ﬁrst divide our sample into two groups according to whether the ﬁrm reported positive NOFO in the
2005 annual report. The NOFO group includes ﬁrms with DNOFO = 1, and the Non-NOFO group includes ﬁrms with DNOFO = 0.
We then calculate abnormal returns in variouswindows around these two regulation issuance dates. The abnormal returns are calcu-
lated using raw returnsminusmarket returns.We present the results in Table 5, Panel A. As we can see from the table, in variouswin-
dow periods, the cumulative abnormal returns of the NOFO group (DNOFO = 1) are generally larger than those of the Non-NOFO
group (DNOFO = 0). Taking the (−1,1)-day window around the regulations as an example, around May 26, 2006, Non-NOFO
ﬁrms have average abnormal returns of−0.4%, while NOFO ﬁrms have average abnormal returns of 1.0%. The difference between
the two groups is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Similarly, around June 1, 2006, Non-NOFO ﬁrms have average abnormal returns
Table 5
Market reactions to announcements of regulations on NOFO.
Panel A: Short-term market reaction to the regulation announcements for ﬁrms with positive NOFO amounts (DNOFO = 1) and for ﬁrms without NOFO problem
(DNOFO = 0)
Window DNOFO = 0 DNOFO = 1 t-Test of difference
Cumulative abnormal returns of various windows surrounding May 26, 2006 (0,1) −0.003⁎⁎ 0.009⁎⁎ −3.73⁎⁎⁎
(−1,1) −0.004⁎⁎ 0.010⁎⁎⁎ −3.66⁎⁎⁎
(−3,3) −0.009⁎⁎⁎ 0.022⁎⁎⁎ −4.60⁎⁎⁎
(−5,5) −0.013⁎⁎⁎ 0.031⁎⁎⁎ −5.45⁎⁎⁎
Cumulative abnormal returns of various windows surrounding June 1, 2006 (0,1) −0.003 0.005⁎⁎ −2.00⁎⁎
(−1,1) −0.005⁎⁎ 0.012⁎⁎⁎ −3.80⁎⁎⁎
(−3,3) −0.012⁎⁎⁎ 0.031⁎⁎⁎ −6.57⁎⁎⁎
(−5,5) −0.011⁎⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎⁎ −5.48⁎⁎⁎
Panel B: Regression results of CAR_526 and CAR_61 on DNOFO (NOFOTA) and control variables. When NOFOTA is used in a regression, only observations with positive
amounts of NOFO are used.





MV −0.012⁎⁎⁎ −0.012⁎⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.018⁎⁎⁎
(−6.52) (−2.98) (−9.60) (−4.47)
MB 0.001 0.000 −0.001 −0.002
(0.66) (0.24) (−0.49) (−1.64)
Constant 0.235⁎⁎⁎ 0.267⁎⁎⁎ 0.432⁎⁎⁎ 0.377⁎⁎⁎
(6.01) (3.14) (9.36) (4.43)
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled
Obs 1178 320 1181 323
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.10
This table presentsmarket reactions to the announcements of regulations that require controlling shareholders to settle NOFO that they owe to listed ﬁrms. CAR_526 is
(t − 1 to t + 1) 3-day cumulative abnormal returns around the May 25, 2006 regulation announcement; CAR_61 is (t − 1 to t + 1) 3-day cumulative abnormal
returns around the June 1, 2006 regulation announcement, where date t is the date of regulation announcement. NOFOTA is NOFO, as disclosed in 2005 annual reports,
divided by total assets. DNOFO is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm has a positive amount of NOFO, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix I for other variable
deﬁnitions. In Panel B, White-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses.
⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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of−0.5%, while NOFO ﬁrms have average abnormal returns of 1.2%; the difference is again signiﬁcant at the 1% level. For various
lengths of windows, the results indicate that in general, the abnormal returns of NOFO ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly higher than those
of Non-NOFO ﬁrms. The results support our hypothesis that these regulations were seen by investors to be effective in solving
the NOFO problem.
Second, we regress cumulative size-adjusted abnormal returns in (−1,1) days around May 26, 2006 (CAR_526) and June 1, 2006
(CAR_61) onDNOFOandNOFOTA.We include theusual control variables, such as SIZE andMB. The regressionmodel is as follows:
CAR 526 orCAR 61ð Þ ¼ β0 þ β1DNOFO orNOFOTAð Þ þ β2MVþ β3MBþ ε:
The results are shown in Table 5, Panel B. In the second and third columns, CAR_526 is the dependent variable. The coefﬁcient of
DNOFO is signiﬁcantly positive (0.010 with t = 2.66), indicating that investors in NOFO ﬁrms believe that the legal threat will force
the controlling shareholders to solve the NOFO problem and increase the ﬁrms' value. The coefﬁcient of NOFOTA is not signiﬁcant
(−0.043 with t =−1.29). In the fourth and ﬁfth columns, the coefﬁcients of DNOFO and NOFOTA on CAR_61 are both signiﬁcantly
positive (0.012with t=2.85 and 0.050with t= 1.77), which suggests that investors believe that the exposure of responsible persons
to the scrutiny of publicmediawill motivate the controlling shareholders to repay theNOFO funds. In summary, these two regulations
that aim to solve the NOFO problem are regarded as effective by the investors. It is also interesting to note that investors seem to have
more conﬁdence in the media than in the legal system because the coefﬁcients and signiﬁcances are larger in the second regression.
3.5. The effects of regulations on future performance and valuation
Jiang et al. (2010) ﬁnd that tunneling activities have a signiﬁcant detrimental effect on ﬁrms' future operating performance and
valuation. An effective remedy for the tunneling problem should therefore lead to performance and valuation improvement, especial-
ly for those ﬁrms that suffer the problem to a greater extent. Our previous tests indicate that while the market believes that the
regulations are effective in resolving NOFO problems, it is not clear whether the performance and valuation of NOFO ﬁrms improved
after the regulations. For this purpose, we examine the operating performance, valuation and long-termmarket performance of these
ﬁrms after the regulation.
We ﬁrst provide some visual evidence. In Fig. 1, we divide the whole sample into three groups: ﬁrms without a NOFO problem
(Non-NOFO), ﬁrms with a low level of NOFO problems (Low-NOFO) and ﬁrms with a high level of NOFO problems (High-NOFO).
We then depict the change of ROA (or ROE) from 2005 to 2008. As we can clearly see, when compared to Non-NOFO ﬁrms, High-
NOFO ﬁrms experienced a lower change of ROA in 2005; however, in 2006 and 2007, High-NOFO ﬁrms experienced a higher change
of ROA. This evidence suggests that High-NOFO ﬁrms beneﬁted from the regulations and increased their operating performance.
Regarding the change in ROE, the ﬁgure shows a similar pattern.
We then run the following regression to rigorously examine the effect of regulations on ﬁrms' long-term performance:
Performance ¼ β0 þ β1POSTþ β2DNOFOþ β3DNOFO  POSTþ β4Controlvariablesþ ε:
Here, the dependent variable is performance or valuation. We examine three variables: ROA, or return on assets, deﬁned as
earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets; ROE, or return on equity, deﬁned as earnings before extraordinary
items divided by the ﬁrm's equity; and TobinQ, deﬁned as (price per share ∗ tradable shares + book value per share ∗ non-tradable
shares + book value of debts) / total assets.16 These variables are commonly used to measure operating performance and valuation.
For independent variables, we construct a dummy variable POST, which takes a value of 1 if the observation occurred after 2005, and 0
otherwise. DNOFO was deﬁned previously to indicate that the ﬁrm has a NOFO problem. We also include the interaction term of
DNOFO and POST. Ourmain interest is the coefﬁcient on the interaction termDNOFO ∗ POST,which captures the effects of regulations
on the operating performance of NOFO ﬁrms. A positive coefﬁcient indicates that NOFO ﬁrms have relatively higher operating perfor-
mance in post-regulation years than in pre-regulation years. Other control variables includeﬁrm size (SIZE), themarket-to-book ratio
(MB), leverage (LEV), ﬁxed-assets ratio (PPE), state ownership (STATE), largest shareholder ownership (FIRST), other large block-
holder ownership (SECFIV) and the degree of marketization (MKT).We run the regression either with OLS or with a ﬁrm-ﬁxed effect
(FE regression). A ﬁrm-ﬁxed effect regression can mitigate the potential omitted variable problem.17
The regression results are presented in Table 6.Weﬁrst look at regressions inwhich ROA or ROE is used as the dependent variable.
As shown in the table, the coefﬁcients of DNOFO are signiﬁcantly negative in the ROA and ROE regressions, suggesting that ﬁrmswith
a NOFO problem generally have a lower performance than other ﬁrms. More importantly, the variable of interest, DNOFO ∗ POST, is
signiﬁcantly positive in these regressions, indicating that NOFO ﬁrms signiﬁcantly improved their operating performance after the
regulations went into effect. The results are consistent with the notion that those regulations aiming to remedy the NOFO problems
are effective and have positive effects on ﬁrm performance, most likely through returned funds that went into operating activities.
16 If we use market price for non-tradable shares in the denominator, the results are similar.
17 When the ﬁrm ﬁxed effect model is used, we have to drop DNOFO because this variable does not change for a ﬁrm in the sample period.
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Second, we look at the regressions that use Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. We are surprised that DNOFO is positive and
marginally signiﬁcant, which indicates that NOFO ﬁrms did not have lower valuations before the regulation. However, the coefﬁcient
of DNOFO ∗ POST is signiﬁcant in theﬁxed-effect regression, suggesting that the valuations of NOFOﬁrms increased after the regulations.
To ensure the robustness of our results, we also perform a few additional tests. First, we use NOFOTA to replace DNOFO in the
aforementioned regressions. DNOFO is a dummy variable that can only represent whether the ﬁrm has a NOFO problem, while
NOFOTA can provide additional information about themagnitude of NOFO.We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients of NOFOTA ∗ POST are signif-
icantly positive in all six regressions, consistent with the results using DNOFO. Second, we examine whether NOFO ﬁrms earn abnor-
mal returns after the regulations. We calculate one-year, two-year, and three-year buy and hold abnormal returns for each ﬁrm
beginning from June 1, 2006. Then, we regress the long-term abnormal returns on DNOFO (or NOFOTA) and other control variables.
The results indicate that DNOFO (or NOFOTA) have signiﬁcantly positive coefﬁcients, suggesting that NOFO ﬁrms have better market
performance than Non-NOFO ﬁrms. The results are consistent with the notion that the regulations are effective in remedying the
NOFO problem. We do not report these results for the sake of brevity.
3.6. The effects of market mechanisms
To further our understanding of the effects of regulations, we also examine the moderating effects of market mechanism
development. A well-developed market mechanism and less government interference foster fair competition, which can
Fig. 1. The change of operating performance after the 2006 regulations. In this ﬁgure, we partition all ﬁrms into three groups based on the reported amounts of NOFO in
2005. The Non-NOFO group includes ﬁrms that reported zero NOFO. Among the ﬁrms that reported positive amounts of NOFO, we partition them into two groups; the
Low-NOFO group includes ﬁrms that reported below-median amounts of NOFOTA, and the High-NOFO group includes ﬁrms that reported above-median amounts of
NOFOTA. A reports the changes of ROA for these three groups between 2005 and 2008, and B reports of changes of ROE in the same period.
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work as an outside mechanism to constrain large shareholder tunneling. On the contrary, large shareholders of ﬁrms in regions
with less-developed market mechanisms can more blatantly tunnel listed ﬁrms. Therefore, the regulations that resolve the
NOFO problem and reduce controlling shareholder expropriation should work better for ﬁrms in regions with lower levels
of marketization.
We divide our whole sample into two subsamples according to the degree of marketization of the region in which the ﬁrm is
registered and rerun regressions in these two subsamples. The results are presented in Table 7. For the sake of brevity, we only
present the results from the ﬁrm-ﬁxed effect regressions. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients of the interaction term (DNOFO ∗ POST)
are all signiﬁcantly positive for ﬁrms located in regions with low marketization. In contrast, for ﬁrms located in regions with
high marketization, the coefﬁcients of DNOFO ∗ POST are only signiﬁcant when ROA is used as the dependent variable. The results
indicate that the regulations to remedy tunneling have a higher marginal effect for ﬁrms located in regions with less-developed
market systems.
In our robustness tests, we also use NOFOTA to replace DNOFO in the regressions, and the results are qualitatively similar.
4. Conclusions
Ourpaper investigates an evident controlling shareholder tunneling behavior, that is, Non-Operational FundOccupancy (orNOFO)
behavior. If a ﬁrm has a NOFO problem, it means that controlling shareholders directly divert the funds of listed ﬁrms to their own
pockets without paying any consideration (or without the intention to pay them back). The frequency of NOFO problems was
extremely severe in China prior to 2006, and Chinese regulators have taken a series of actions to resolve this issue.
One action was to require listed ﬁrms to disclose detailed information about NOFO in their 2005 ﬁnancial statements, which
provides a clear indication of the nature and amount of the funds being diverted. We therefore collect information about NOFO and
examine a series of research questions about tunneling.
Table 6
Performance and valuation after the 2006 regulations.
Variables ROA ROE TobinQ
OLS Fixed effect OLS Fixed effect OLS Fixed effect
DNOFO −0.036⁎⁎⁎ −0.096⁎⁎⁎ 0.029⁎
(−11.34) (−6.28) (1.72)
POST −0.010⁎⁎⁎ −0.003 0.013⁎ 0.039⁎⁎⁎ 0.412⁎⁎⁎ −0.017
(−5.13) (−1.10) (1.71) (3.11) (21.80) (−0.84)
DNOFO ∗ POST 0.027⁎⁎⁎ 0.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.077⁎⁎⁎ 0.064⁎⁎⁎ 0.027 0.073⁎⁎
(6.58) (4.94) (4.17) (3.42) (0.75) (2.23)
FIRST 0.000⁎⁎⁎ 0.000⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎⁎
(5.61) (4.99) (6.26) (3.99) (−9.36) (−12.68)
SECFIV 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.013⁎⁎⁎
(0.39) (−0.89) (1.24) (−1.62) (−0.84) (−6.22)
STATE −0.005⁎⁎⁎ −0.010 −0.019⁎⁎ −0.038 −0.212⁎⁎⁎ −0.137⁎⁎⁎
(−2.58) (−1.36) (−2.41) (−1.13) (−9.67) (−2.85)
MKT −0.001 −0.007⁎⁎⁎ 0.002 −0.018⁎ −0.030⁎⁎⁎ −0.030⁎
(−1.20) (−2.90) (1.04) (−1.79) (−5.61) (−1.69)
SIZE 0.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.014⁎⁎⁎ 0.026⁎⁎⁎ −0.017 0.237⁎⁎⁎ 0.783⁎⁎⁎
(20.10) (3.91) (6.70) (−1.05) (17.36) (31.56)
MB 0.003⁎⁎⁎ 0.002⁎⁎⁎ −0.018⁎⁎⁎ −0.019⁎⁎⁎
(6.28) (4.42) (−7.51) (−6.27)
LEV −0.136⁎⁎⁎ −0.141⁎⁎⁎ −0.022 0.038 0.360⁎⁎⁎ 0.746⁎⁎⁎
(−21.16) (−14.87) (−1.13) (0.94) (4.63) (7.71)
PPE −0.014⁎⁎ −0.028⁎⁎ −0.087⁎⁎⁎ −0.173⁎⁎⁎ −0.340⁎⁎⁎ 0.319⁎⁎
(−2.50) (−2.57) (−3.50) (−2.95) (−5.04) (2.45)
Constant −0.331⁎⁎⁎ −0.138⁎ −0.449⁎⁎⁎ 0.619⁎ −3.430⁎⁎⁎ −15.175⁎⁎⁎
(−16.76) (−1.90) (−5.68) (1.87) (−12.04) (−27.53)
Industry Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm ﬁxed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Obs 5830 5830 5830 5830 5830 5830
Adjusted R2 or within R2 0.40 0.25 0.10 0.07 0.24 0.54
Firm Obs 1307 1307 1307
This table presents regression results of ROA, ROE and TobinQ on DNOFO, and the dummy variable POST that takes a value of 1 if a ﬁrm-year observation is after 2005,
and 0 otherwise, plus control variables. The sample period is from 2004 to 2008. DNOFO is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the ﬁrm has a positive amount of
NOFO in the 2005 annual report, and 0 otherwise. See Appendix I for other variable deﬁnitions. Size in TobinQ regressions refers to log(MV).White-adjusted t-statistics
are in parentheses.
⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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We ﬁrst examine the factors that affect tunneling throughNOFO.We show that ownership structure affects tunneling. Speciﬁcally,
the shareholding percentage of the controlling shareholder and the relative bargaining power of the controlling shareholder vs. other
block shareholders are positively related to NOFO. Corporate governance mechanisms had some effects on tunneling. Speciﬁcally,
NOFO is negatively related to managerial ownership and institutional shareholding and is positively related to agency costs. In
addition, institutional environments affect tunneling. NOFO ﬁrms aremore likely to be located in regionswith less-developedmarket
systems and are more likely to be IPOs under the old quota policy.
Second, we examine themarket reactions to two regulations that intended to resolve the NOFO problem and increase the protec-
tion ofminority shareholders. The regulations rely either on the legal systemor the press.We show that themarket positively reacts to
these two regulations, suggesting that investors believe that these regulations can effectively solve the NOFO problem.
Third, we show that the operating performance of NOFO ﬁrms signiﬁcantly increased after the implementation of the regulations
and that the valuation of NOFO ﬁrms signiﬁcantly increased after the regulations, conﬁrming that the regulators' approach to resolv-
ing the NOFO problem was effective. We also show that the positive effect is mainly observed for ﬁrms located in regions with less-
developed markets.
A salient advantage of our paper is that we use a direct measure of an ofﬁcially deﬁned tunneling activity, which adds to our
understanding of speciﬁc channels and the severity of the tunneling problem. Our study also demonstrates the positive effects of
regulations that aimed to remedy the tunneling problem. One limitation of our study is that by focusing on one type of tunneling,
we may neglect other varieties of tunneling channels and the interactions between those channels.
After 2006, the NOFO problemwas mostly resolved in China with the enforcement of the two new regulations that we examined in
this paper. However, evenwith the split-share reform of 2006, when non-tradable shares owned by controlling shareholders were con-
verted into tradable shares, the incentives that gave rise to theNOFOproblems remain largely intact in Chineseﬁrms.While one channel
of tunneling (NOFO) was closed, new channels may arise as long as the incentives to do so persist. The battle to curb controlling share-
holder expropriation of minority shareholders will plague Chinese regulators in the years to come. Our paper sheds light on effective
governance and investor protection mechanisms and provides evidence of the beneﬁts of promoting such practices.
Table 7
Operating performance and valuation after the 2006 regulations conditional on marketization.
Variables ROA ROE TobinQ
MKT = High MKT = Low MKT = High MKT = Low MKT = High MKT = Low
POST −0.008⁎⁎⁎ 0.001 0.011 0.065⁎⁎⁎ −0.016 0.009
(−2.71) (0.29) (0.79) (2.95) (−0.69) (0.27)
DNOFO ∗ POST 0.018⁎⁎⁎ 0.019⁎⁎⁎ 0.025 0.085⁎⁎⁎ 0.041 0.106⁎⁎
(3.08) (3.54) (0.95) (3.32) (0.88) (2.41)
FIRST 0.000⁎⁎⁎ 0.000⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎⁎ 0.001⁎⁎ −0.003⁎⁎⁎ −0.005⁎⁎⁎
(4.83) (3.19) (3.12) (2.49) (−7.22) (−10.18)
SECFIV −0.001⁎⁎ 0.000 −0.002 −0.001 −0.014⁎⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎⁎
(−2.31) (0.57) (−1.51) (−0.93) (−4.45) (−4.55)
STATE −0.003 −0.016 −0.087⁎ 0.013 −0.070 −0.211⁎⁎
(−0.36) (−1.51) (−1.91) (0.27) (−1.48) (−2.53)
MKT −0.008⁎⁎⁎ −0.003 −0.004 −0.028 0.008 −0.107⁎⁎⁎
(−3.22) (−0.68) (−0.40) (−1.39) (0.33) (−3.67)
SIZE 0.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.007 −0.010 −0.028 0.750⁎⁎⁎ 0.795⁎⁎⁎
(4.43) (1.37) (−0.61) (−1.05) (21.53) (22.39)
MB 0.002⁎⁎⁎ 0.001 −0.016⁎⁎⁎ −0.023⁎⁎⁎
(5.21) (1.52) (−3.84) (−5.03)
LEV −0.139⁎⁎⁎ −0.145⁎⁎⁎ 0.028 0.033 0.787⁎⁎⁎ 0.726⁎⁎⁎
(−7.04) (−14.26) (0.44) (0.63) (4.76) (6.27)
PPE −0.036⁎⁎ −0.021 −0.169⁎⁎ −0.177⁎⁎ 0.285 0.382⁎⁎
(−2.43) (−1.29) (−2.29) (−2.01) (1.45) (2.24)
Constant −0.250⁎⁎⁎ −0.030 0.459 0.835 −14.937⁎⁎⁎ −14.856⁎⁎⁎
(−2.76) (−0.28) (1.32) (1.53) (−18.97) (−18.86)
Industry No No No No No No
Firm ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 2853 2977 2853 2977 2853 2977
Firm Obs 651 715 651 715 651 715
Within R2 0.25 0.25 0.06 0.09 0.52 0.55
This table presents regression results of ROA, ROE and TobinQ on DNOFO, and the dummy variable POST that takes a value of 1 if a ﬁrm-year observation is after 2005,
and 0 otherwise, plus control variables. The sample period is from 2004 to 2008. DNOFO is a dummy variable that a takes value of 1 if the ﬁrm has a positive amount of
NOFO in the 2005 annual report, and 0 otherwise. DNOFO value is the same for a ﬁrm in all years during the sample period. MKT is the Fan andWang (2006) market-
ization index of Chinese provinces. We assign the provincial index value to all ﬁrms registered in the same province. MKT = High refers to the sample of ﬁrms from
provinces whose marketization index is above the national average, and MKT = Low refers to the sample of ﬁrms from the rest provinces. See Appendix I for other
variable deﬁnitions. Sizes in TobinQ regressions refer to log(MV). White-adjusted t-statistics are in parentheses.
⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Variable Deﬁnition
NOFO Disclosed amounts of Non-Operational Fund Occupancy in year 2005 annual report of Chinese listed ﬁrms
NOFOTA NOFO divided by total assets
DNOFO Dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 if NOFO N 0, and 0 otherwise
POST Dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 for ﬁrm-years after 2005, and 0 otherwise
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